Victory in Iraq

The most recent events in Karbala don't appear to be too interesting: another example of the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. Depending on the source, around 50 Shi'a pilgrims were killed in street clashes, with hundreds more being injured. Again, sources differ but the violence was either between Badr Brigade forces, the military wing of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (formerly the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, when it was housed in and funded by Shi'a Iran), the Jaysh al-Mahdi (the Army of the Messiah, Moqtada al-Sadr's private Shi'a army and/or government forces (enforcing order at the behest of a Shi'a government). No matter who the players were, given that this was a Shi'a religious festival, it's safe to assume that Shi'as did most of the fighting. In the wake of the violence, Moqtada al-Sadr stood down his forces, claiming that they will continue to stand down for another six months.

Washington welcomed al-Sadr's decision, which, in of itself, is noteworthy. In 2004, when al-Sadr emerged onto the scene, Paul Bremer et al. dismissed anything and everything he had to say as the rantings of a criminal. In the past three years, through elections, charity work, militias and de facto control of neighborhoods, al-Sadr demonstrated his political muscle, making him no longer a man to be ignored. This most recent order is a big gamble, maybe the biggest of a career full of them. Most people, both American and Iraqi, doubt he has the political clout to control the thousands of gun-toting thugs that claim affiliation with Jaysh al-Mahdi (the Army of the Messiah). It is widely believed that Iraqi on Iraqi violence will continue in al-Sadr's name. If that's the case, al-Sadr is exposed as a figurehead to the resistance; fighters use his name as a rallying cry. In the event that the Jaysh al-Mahdi stands down, as per his orders, then God help the Iraqis. Moqtada al-Sadr, a man as authoritarian as Sadaam Husayn, will be the new power in Iraq.

Not that the rest of Iraq will go easy into that good night. The most recent violence in Karbala, along with the violence in Basra as the British pull-out, shows that Iran, evil, omni-potent Iran, may have a bigger mess on its hands than we do. In its desire to have a finger in as many pots as possible, Iran is now funding the two major players in a Shi'a civil war: the Badr Brigade and the Jaysh al-Mahdi. The Washington Post article above states that al-Sadr has made numerous visits to see his patrons in Iran, and we know about the Badr Brigade's long history with Iran. An American withdrawal means these two slug it out for dominance, (with Sunnis and marginal groups like al-Qaeda occasionally getting in a shot or two) while Iran acts as some kind of maudlin conductor.






And they all lived happily ever after.





If the original intent for the war was to improve America's immediate, short-term security (and that of her ally Israel), then this scenario can be classified as nothing short of a stunning, unmitigated success. Sure, it's a craven, evil success, where millions will unnecessarily die, be injured, or forced into exile, but a success, nonetheless. Sadaam Husayn is dead and cannot threaten anyone with imaginary weapons, Iran is so preoccupied with Iraq that it cannot threaten anyone with imaginary weapons, and Afghanistan can only threaten itself with small, real weapons. Everyone west of Iraq (I mean you, Syria) will stay in-line, for no other reason than out of fear that the internecine conflict raging to the east will spread to their lands. We win.







Did he really need to subdue her with a headlock to kiss her? We won WWII, for God's sakes!







Of course, it's these kinds of short-term victories that become long-term disasters. In the past, the American government was a bit more... subtle in spreading chaos for its own ends. Iran; Afghanistan; Guatemala: all examples of the United States quietly kicking the can down the road. Later, of course, we step on the same can, only now it's jagged metal and rusted, and we scream in pain and demand someone pick-up the garbage. This particular can, the Iraq to Afghanistan chaos, encompassing millions of people in a contiguous area, will lay in wait in our path, rusting, festering and harboring God knows what type of rats.

Gary Kamiya Stole my Idea

In this piece on Salon, Gary Kamiya basically says what I said... 10 days ago. Aux Armes... Historiens.

I'm just saying, is all.

The World's Biggest Frat House

There's a highly descriptive article about life in Somalia posted here in the Washington Post. Basically, the article states that only three things work in the country: the drug trade; cell phones; and money transfers from abroad. There is little potable water, no garbage services, no jobs, and no sewage system. In effect, Somalia resembles the Pike house at your alma mater: a bunch of guys wallowing in filth, talking on their phones, waiting to score some hash, and asking mom and dad to send more money to pay for their phones and hash. This would be funny if it weren't the logical conclusion for states run exclusively by men.


We bought these shirts with our textbook money! (PS, whatever you do, do NOT Google image search "frat guys." Bad move)




The article states that women don't chew the khat (the leaf of choice, a mild and highly addictive amphetamine), it is the strict purview of the men. In a society that also sequesters its women from the workplace, this means the women have little role in public life. Like in a frat house, company breeds complacency. As long as no one goes to class, tries hard in school, or has a steady girlfriend, then all of the brothers don't have to worry about these things. Introduce a woman, or any outsider not pleased with the status quo (a woman works for this example because most Pike houses I've been in don't have toilet seats), and the entire equilibrium is thrown off.

Somalia has endured much, and one cannot blame the Somalis for all of their country's ills. The legacy of colonialism, CARE and the early American withdrawal all contributed to making Somalia the failed state it is today. That being said, Somalis need to take some stock in themselves if they wish to get off the snide. The Islamic Courts banned khat (amongst other things) during its brief reign, and the article states it was the first time men worked in the afternoons for years, proving that the country isn't a lost cause. Surely there has to be a more acceptable way of weening the country from its massive drug problem than relying on religious, AK-touting thugs, the Dean Wormers of the international community.

Allowing women a more active role in the public arena would be a giant leap forward for Somalia. Of course, that's not to say that the women will not just start chewing khat, staring at nothing from 3 PM until bedtime, and calling family in Europe, begging for money, but it's a start. It's impossible to think that Somali men will have a sudden change of heart and suddenly allow women to participate. Therefore, Somalia is dependent on the international community, aid agencies and NGO's. These organizations must establish jobs, tasks and schools aimed directly at women. If we can draw Somali women out into the open, maybe the country stands a chance after all.








David Bowie did his part, it's time for the rest of us.

Fait Accompli

This article, titled "No Big Shifts Planned" in the Washington Post exposes General Petraeus and Ryan Cocker for who they are: the newly minted shills for President Bush. How many times, over the summer, have we heard the president say, "I will not make any decisions until I hear from General Petraeus." You'd think that General Petraeus is the new commander-in-chief, the way the president deferred to his judgement. Now we know why: General Petraeus was never going to give an honest assesment of the surge. Four-star generals are politicians, not responsible commanders. As such, they are capable of discerning which way the wind blows, and reacting accordingly with little regard for the safety and welfare of the men under them. Petraeus was chosen, of all the available candidates, because his academic credentials would buy the administration more credibility. Unfortunately, Sen. John Warner's calls for an early troop withdrawal forced the president's hand. This story was leaked to the Washington Post, and exposed General Petraeus for the fraud he is. Can't trust an Ivy Leaguer. Any of them.

Aux Armes, Historiens!

I've defended President Bush numerous times. Rarely his policies, but the man himself. When people call him dumb, I tell them they're missing something. He's not dumb. No matter who you are, you don't become president if you're dumb. Hell, he's smarter than Al Gore, who thought he could get away with a "Look How Smart I Am!" campaign in 2000 (it worries me that the Democrats keep thinking they should go back to this well, dangerously close to nominating an unelectable though highly qualified candidate). But the president's speech comparing Iraq to Vietnam is so far beyond the pale of acceptability, such an affront to history that it shows the dangers of darkening counsel with words without knowledge. Intelligence without knowledge is craven and dangerous, and is usually associated with those focused solely on their own aggrandizement.


This Gob taught us all a little something about ourselves. And, he's more photogenic.



In the speech the president rehashes a long-dead argument of die-hard Goldwater supporters that the United States was winning the Vietnam War in 1973. We were killing Communists at a rate far higher than they were killing free-market democrats, both of the American and Vietnamese ilk. President Ford's refusal to send in air-support for Saigon in 1975 was the real stab-in-the-back, which resulted in the deaths of thousands in South Vietnam, and, tangentially, millions in Cambodia.

Stab in der Rückseite!- Yeah, you said it, Gunter.

President Bush may believe this; it's doubtful that he's read any histories of the Vietnamese wars, or even the more accessible, America-centric works by David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan. Had he read these books, he would see that it wasn't an American withdrawal that caused the massive bloodletting. In fact, it was the American presence in the first place that exacerbated it.

Playing what-if is something of a fool's errand, as just about everyone can come up with an alternative what-if scenario. However, most reasonable scenarios regarding Vietnam in the 60's would assume that, had President Eisenhower never sent one adviser to South Vietnam, and had Kennedy had continued this policy, Vietnam would have united, most likely under the most famous nationalist Ho Chi Minh, by the early to mid-sixties. Ho Chi Minh could be brutal, though unlike that of Kim Sung Il and Josef Stalin, his aggressions tended to be more focused, less malicious. There would have been a fair amount of purging in Saigon, but, with no American occupation, there would not have been millions of "collaborators" to purge. Hundreds of thousands of "government workers, intellectuals and businessmen" would not have perished had it not been for American presence in the first place.






We have a report of a cosmic prowler in the area, peeping in on people's houses. Twenty feet tall, bald, no eye color, dresses like a Roman senator. Some kinda weird neck brace to support his giant head. Sounds like a real pervert.










Of course, these are the types of lessons one learns from a serious study of the Vietnam wars. It's easy to focus on the specific, than dismissing them as non-applicable to the current quagmire (Vietnamese lived in huts, Iraqis have concrete!). But the broad lessons are universal, lessons like wars rarely go as planned, and there's a reason we call them "foreign" countries. I've often argued that the president is smarter than he puts on, and I still maintain that, but I doubt he's much of an intellectual; part of now SecState Rice's original job description was lecturing Governor Bush on world affairs. As David Halberstam articulated (from the grave) in the most recent Vanity Fair, the president has little regard for the lessons of history, bandying them about when it suits his needs.

The president's speech might cast light on what will be the real lesson of the Iraq War: the American President, in a time of great danger and opportunity, sacrificed billions of dollars, thousands of lives, and sullied the name of the United States of America because he never read a book. Hopefully, thirty-two years from now, there won't be some gray-haired, silver-spooned Ivy Leaguer standing in front of a group of aging Iraq War veterans, a plebeian group which he would never have deigned speak to before, telling them that we lost Iraq because we left too early.

Water Water Everywhere, So Let's Have a Drink!

The Sunday Washington Post (WaPo for those in the know) ran a feature article about the effects of global warming/climate change on arid and semi-arid climates. The long and the short of it is that one of the most palpable effects of global warming will be an intensification of drought/glut cycles in these areas. Most people read the words arid and semi-arid and automatically think of the Sahara, but this is not the case. As the article states, the United States and Middle East will bare the brunt of the crisis.

The rear window on my Jetta was once stuck open for eight straight months. For most people, living anywhere other than California, a window stuck open would merit attention right away; you never know when the next storm is coming. At the time, my car was parked in the central valley, home of the most lucrative agriculture in America, and also home to not a drop of rain from March until October. Being a semi-arid climate, and the breadbasket to one of the world's largest economies, central California does not get any rain in the summer, and the only after-effects for the Jetta were a few leaves in the backseat.





Wanna buy a lemon?









The climate of the Middle East, home to over 300 million people, and growing fast, is similar. Like California, it relies on seasonal rainfall and rivers that originate in far away lands or micro-climates (the Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates, the Jordan). Unlike California, which, as anyone who has ever since the film Chinatown knows, has expensive and modern waterworks, most of the water infrastructure in the Middle East is antiquated, to say the least. In many places, farmers rely on draught animals to raise and distribute water. The distribution and allocation techniques are even more arcane. As the water supply diminishes, and the population grows, there will be an increasingly aggressive competition for water. As if things weren't bad enough with a myriad of sects, ethnicities, tribes and religions all cast into a small area, now one must add a lack of water to the calculus.



Forget it, Jake, it's Chinatown. An adorable, cuddly, lovable, oh so huggable Chinatown.




This issue still gets short shrift when people talk about the Middle East. Obviously, IED's, suicide bombers, smart bombs and AK-47s are a much more immediate threat to the welfare of most Middle Easterners, but a long-term shortage of water is every bit as dangerous as a poorly-planned invasion. The two river systems that are most vulnerable, the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates, are not coincidentally, the most famous.

Since 1969, when Egypt agreed to share a certain amount of the Nile's water (19 billion cubic meters, if you're scoring at home) with the Sudan, the Sudan has never actually been able to use its entire quota. As such, it has flowed downstream, where a thirsty Egypt soaks it right up. After the 2003 peace deal between north and south in the Sudan, it looked like the country might, for the first time ever, use its allocated amount, and thus leave Egypt with a grave shortage. Thankfully for the Egyptians, eastern and western Sudan erupted into rebellion, mainly over the spoils of oil, distracting Khartoum to the point where, once again, Egypt was not left high and dry. As a perfect example of how water crises breed instability, Egypt has a vested interest in the Sudan's continued state of jackassery, and has done little to end the slaughters in Darfur.

Obviously, California is not the Sudan nor is it Egypt, but the principle stands. Complacent people are less inclined to fight; look nor further than Switzerland. In agrarian societies, living standards are directly tied to the quality of the land. Higher temperatures means less water in traditionally agrarian settings which means worse land and therefore more violence.





Had Steve McQueen made this jump, the Swiss would have immediately deported him back to Nazi occupied lands, because they're such pussies.

10% Tip, 90% Asshole

Maybe I'm not the best waiter in the world; maybe I don't like food; maybe I don't make good first impressions, but seriously, 10%? Your food was hot when you got it, your order was right, I re-filled your drinks. I know I don't have tits (though I do wear plunging necklines), but come one. 10%?!? You were willing to spend 80 bucks because you were too lazy to make yourself pasta, and you can't splurge that last four dollars to make 15%?





She stole those shorts from my closet.






In lieu of a draft that has been on the tip of many tongues, I support, nay DEMAND, a period of mandatory restaurant service for all able-bodied Americans aged 22-23. It goes like this: everyone who ever wants to eat in a restaurant (ergo, everyone) must work at least one month, full-time, in a restaurant. It can be any restaurant, as long as there is table service. Like a military draft, which would greatly discourage the abuse of American hegemony by those most likely to abuse it (rich, white men who never served in the military), a restaurant draft would greatly discourage skin-thrift tippers (rich, white men who never worked in a restaurant).






I wanted that dressing on the side!








I'm talking to you, old guy that smiles, jokes, for whom everything is great, then all of the sudden becomes the Grinch when the bill comes. "Bill? What bill? I didn't know that I'd be charged for this meal! No one ever said that. Well, this is coming out of your tip." And you, Ms.-Let's-Split-The-Check so we can tip on the lowest amount only.

Assholes.

Pull-Out and Spurt

الى ذلك يتوقع مسؤولو ادارة الرئيس جورج بوش من القائد العسكري الاميركي في العراق الجنرال ديفيد بترايوس، أن يوصي بسحب القوات الأميركية عاجلا من عدد من المناطق، حيث يعتقد القادة العسكريون ان الأمن قد تحسن فيها، ويحتمل ان تكون بينها محافظتا الانبار وني

This was the final sentence in Sharq al-Aswat's coverage of the bombings in northwest Iraq. Lord knows I've mis-translated important things before, but I do believe this says:

It is expected by American officials within the administration of George Bush that the American military leader in Iraq, General David Petraeus, will recommend the withdrawal of American forces from a number of urgent areas, where the military leadership believes the security has already improved. It is assumed that these are the provinces of Anbar AND Nineveh.

The Washington Post, in an article about General Petraeus' upcoming report to Congress, says nothing about a potential withdrawal. Instead, it focuses on the bickering between Congress and the administration. The Bush administration now claims that General Petraeus will report directly to the president, who, along with the NSC, will pass its report onto Congress. Obviously, Congress is furious about receiving Petraeus' and Crocker's reports through a filter, but this entire controversy might be just smoke and mirrors. As any good magician knows, diversion is the most important part of a good illusion. This brouhaha in the Post might be nothing more than a diversion from the real story: that the American military is planning to withdraw from the largest, and historically most violent, province in Iraq.




Illusion, Michael.








As an aside, this would not be the first time the administration has allowed a major development to leak to the Arab press before the American press. The recent story about the 190,000 missing AK-47's appeared in Dar al-Hayat days before it became a sensation in America. As to why this is, I could only speculate. Perhaps the administration understands its target audience a little better than we think they do? Again, this is speculation, but the above sentence appears at the very bottom of an article about the bombings in Iraq. Possibly knowing that this information would be shuttled to the back-burner is why the Arab press gets it first.

In any event, if this is true, it will be General Petraeus' major salve to war critics at home. As I said before, the jobs of Lieutenant General and up are more about being a politician than an effective military commander. This would explain why seemingly incompetent generals like Richard Myers, Tommy Franks and Peter Pace get promoted so high, while men like David McKiernan, James Mattis and Eric Shinseki top out earlier. General Petraeus knows the political environment back home, and, as a dedicated soldier, believes in seeing his mission to fruition (regardless of what he may feel about the mission.) Withdrawing from these two provinces, especially the infamous al-Anbar, buys him time to "complete" his mission. As a politician/general, and as is stated in the counter-insurgency handbook, the key to the mission is political, and therefore, in Baghdad. If al-Anbar and Nineveh have to be turned over to the wolves for the greater good, so be it.

Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA Review Pt. 2

This book can be easily divided into three parts: the CIA's inception and early growing pains; its heyday, when then Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles spun an elaborate web of lies regarding the agency's accomplishments; and finally 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq. The CIA's involvement in Afghanistan prior to 9/11 is well-trod ground, the subject of Steve Coll's Pulitzer Prize winning Ghost Wars. Much of Weiner's critiques of the Agency in the lead-up to the Iraq War are old hat: George Tenet sold his soul to please his political masters. What's revealing about the requiem of this book is how the nominal reformer, Porter Goss, was consistent with the Bush administration's attempt to install "loyal Bushies" in every corner of the government.

Something needs to be said, firstly, about the great mass of the interior of the book. Like the first half, it is told in an anecdotal way, with each chapter focusing on a particular country or specific event. This approach leads to an overload of information, especially of foreign names that become increasingly difficult to keep track of. Despite that, the book's crescendo is its account of the agency's adventures during the 60's. Weiner makes it abundantly clear that the CIA peaked, as an institution, during the Vietnam War.

During the war, the Agency did its best analysis, though its information gathering was still suspect. Along with voices sprinkled throughout the Defense Department, the CIA gave early and constant warning that America's efforts in southeast Asia were doomed as long as the governments of its proxies (South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) remained unpopular. Unlike the executive branch, which skews to the autocrat, the CIA's analysts seemed to understand, innately, the importance of popular support. Unfortunately for America, the CIA's outlook during Vietnam was an aberration. It was a quick and effusive moment of integrity on the part of an institution otherwise marred by lies, corruption and incompetence.





The Vietnam War was also a high-water mark for handsomeness in the CIA.













There are two great stories in the book: one is regarding the Kennedy-Castro rivalry, the other the Indonesia adventure in 1965. There is a strong insinuation that Kennedy's assassination was the result of his plans (plural) to assassinate Castro. Weiner gives the reader much of the information over a number of chapters. It reads like a Greek tragedy, where the audience knows the sad conclusion, but can't help but love watching the narrative unfold in front of them. Weiner uses his sources well, allowing them to voice his conclusions. In this particular instance, it is clear that Weiner wants his reader to draw a link between the CIA's activities in Cuba (and Latin America) and Kennedy's assassination.





Castro signs his first big-league contract.








The other great story of the 60's took place on the opposite side of the world, in Indonesia. In 1965, the independent Indonesian President Sukarno began to make overtures towards the Communist bloc. Fearing the fall of Indonesia, the CIA began a private war, arming the rebellious General Suharto's forces in eastern Indonesia. The CIA's war was so private, in fact, no one else in Washington even knew about it. At one point, when President Sukarno needed military assistance to suppress the rebels, he turned to the American military attache in Jakarta. The Army officer gladly supplied him with maps and logistical advice that helped defeat the CIA's paramilitary forces in the east. In effect, Americans were fighting Americans.

Despite the agency's early massive failures, the Indonesian and Cuban adventures being the most egregious, it was during this time that successive directors Allen Dulles and Richard Helmes began to build-up the myth of the CIA. They deflected all criticism, regardless of how well-researched, with the now familiar axiom, "All our successes are secret, all our failures are public." Journalists, many of them ex-employees, aided the directors in their quest. Wiener's greatest accomplishment is in discrediting this particular falsehood. It becomes clear that the CIA's "successes" were every bit the failure their failures were.


Voter participation would sky-rocket if we had booths like that.




Even the successful operations, where the agency predicated regime change, (Iran, Guatemala, Congo/Zaire, Chile and Afghanistan, to name the highlights) were eventual disasters, both for the people of those countries and for the United States. In each case, the CIA convinced the executive (who many times didn't need that much arm-twisting) that there was a quick-fix to legitimate foreign policy problems. The agency numbed the symptoms, but never attacked the disease. The disease, be it Soviet-backed communism, religious-based terrorism or just plain old anti-Americanism, quietly festered and grew stronger. In the meantime, the indigenous people suffered under sadistic, sticky-fingered rulers like the Shah, Mobutu Sese-Seko, and Pinochet.

While the CIA distracted itself on paramilitary operations like those listed above, activities that Weiner stresses again and again lie far outside its charter, it failed to provide the United States with any actual intelligence of real value. From the fall of the Berlin Wall to the collapse of the Soviet Union, from India and Pakistan's nuclear brinkmanship to 9/11, the CIA never once gave any president an adequate, specific warning of events to come. Weiner's epitaph for the agency can be found on the last page of his book. "For sixty years tens of thousands of clandestine service officers have gathered only the barest threads of truly important intelligence - and that is the CIA's deepest secret."



The Emperor to-be resplendent in purple.










There is one big question that Legacy of Ashes leaves on the table: Are Americans better off without a functioning intelligence service? Obviously, the United States needs to pay lip-service to intelligence, for no other reason than without an agency, there would be thousands of Ivy League liberal arts majors wandering the streets with a deep sense of ennui. Without a working intelligence/paramilitary agency, the American government is forced to rely upon its overt institutions, like the State Department, the military and Congress to design, explain and implement foreign policy. These open parties, by definition have to adhere far more to traditional American values of honesty, transparency and democracy than the clandestine services. We need to ask ourselves: Is this such a bad thing?

Syria Hates Goodness

As Joshua Landis reports in a recent posting, Syria has banned Haifa Wahbi from entering the country.

I would like to take this opportunity to let Haifa and her managers know that she is always welcome in the great state of Montana.






Bus al-wawa.

Cup Runneth Over

On a visit to Amman, any conversation with a local will invariably turn to the war to the east. Sometimes these conversations are painless, where you can move on with a simple, sad, "What a poor country," or "Yeah, Bush is a jackass." Other times, depending upon the person, the discussion can be uncomfortable, long and filled with a little malice. These are usually the ones that involve Israel to varying degrees. I remember a friend of mine recounting one such conversation which ended with the Jordanian man saying of Iraqis, "They are all a brutal people."

As Iraq slides deeper into chaos, this depiction of Iraqis as beasts grows amongst its neighbors, and in some cases, even becomes institutionalized. This post by an Iraqi dentist, headed to Amman for vacation but detained at the Jordanian airport for 48 hours before ultimately being sent home, shows how deep this dynamic has already progressed. The rest of his work is equally compelling and shows the depths to which Iraq has sunk. Assuming this post is true, (if not, it's an amazing piece of fiction and deserving of a National Book Award in its own right) then God help the Iraqis, because their Arab neighbors certainly won't.




Dentists: A drill in their hands and a song in their hearts.





Kuwait long ago staked out its claim vis-a-vis the suffering of Iraqis. Robert Fisk, in his most recent book The Great War for Civilization, recounts an anecdote from 1991, just after the first Gulf War. The Kuwaitis, having just rid their country of the Iraqi invaders, with a little help from their friends, denied southern Iraqis transit into their country. Instead, in the spirit of 1930's Europe regarding a previous refugee crisis, they turned them back. With nowhere else to go, they faced Saddam Husayn's brutal retaliations for the aborted uprising. (To make matters worse, Kuwait had no means of enforcing this policy, and ordered American soldiers to stand border duty to do their dirty work.) It has been a long-standing policy of the Kuwaiti royal family to look after its own, and only its own.



We'd love to help you Iraqis out, but it's no picnic down here either. I mean, do you know how much gas a stretch Hummer limo uses?





Saudi Arabia isn't helping.

It is unlikely that the Iraq war is going to spread into the regional conflagration, as commentators and critics alike, suggest. It is unlikely for no other reason than Iraq's neighbors have no sympathy for Iraqis; they will send them back to die where they were born. The Domino theory does not apply. Instead, when the American military begins its withdrawal, it will leave a country awash in weapons with no government to speak of.

Or we might win. Who's to say?

Everyman a Stanley-Freud

"I once knew an Episcopalian lady in Newport, Rhode Island, who asked me to design and build a doghouse for her Great Dane. The lady claimed to understand God and His Ways of Working perfectly. She could not understand why anyone should be puzzled about what had been or about what was going to be.

"And yet, when I showed her a blueprint of the doghouse I proposed to build, she said to me, 'I'm sorry, but I never could read one of those things.'

"'Give it to your husband or your minister to pass onto God,' I said, 'and, when God finds a minute, I'm sure he'll explain this doghouse of mine in a way that even you can understand.'

"She fired me."

-Kurt Vonnegut, Cat's Cradle

Like the woman in the story, pundits, writers and bloggers all lay claim to some divine knowledge. Only their knowledge is not of God, but of the president of the United States; a leader who behaves in similarly cryptic ways, explaining himself only to his chosen people.

The best, and most intelligent, example of this is found in Gary Kamiya's writings on Salon.com. His most recent work is especially thought-provoking. Thought-provoking, but, like the Episcopalian woman's world view, based on an unburdened faith. Kamiya's faith is not in God, but in his own intellect; he believes it is possible to discern the workings of Bush's inner mind. In this world, the president's stubbornness is part and parcel of his previous alcoholism; his warmongering is consistent with his draft-dodging; his policy stems from his professed faith.




Hey, check it out. That guy's smoking a cigar. Paging Dr. Freud, paging Dr. Freud... Oh... good... you're already here... good.











We know a great deal about our presidents, increasingly so in this new age of rampant information. Still, most of us have never met a president, and those that have usually not for more than two minutes. This is especially true of this president, whose handlers ensure that he preaches to the choir, meets only yes-men and those not likely to challenge him. As such, none of us can say that we've looked into his eyes, had deep intellectual discussions with him, or fully understand his motives.

To say that the President is a quasi-Manicheanist, that either he wants to win in Iraq or lose badly, as Kamiya does, is based less on fact and more on his liberal understanding of Evangelical Christianity. Kamiya may know a great deal about Christian theology and history, but his understanding of the Evangelical movement with which the President identifies is limited. Like proper Victorian gentlemen-explorers entering an African village, where the inhabitants of this land use neither reason nor intellect, liberals immediately recognizes their inferiors. They study them, measure them, draw them, occasionally fornicate with them, and, in doing so, find their defining traits, their eternal essences. Ultimately, the explorer believes he knows how the savage will act before the savage himself does. After all, they are a simple people, ruled by an even more simple code.






Bula Mutari? Sir? When's it going to be my turn to hold the gun?










As the white explorers/colonizers found out, often violently, they didn't know their subjects near as well as they thought. The subjects were not simple, passive objects to be studied, but living, thinking organisms, acutely aware and dangerously capable of manipulating their surroundings. The same is the case with President Bush and Evangelicals. There are some very, very capable, intelligent people associated with this movement, the president himself being one of them. Kamiya's belief that he can extract all of the president's motivations and desires from his faith is wrong. Wrong and more than a little pandering.

Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA Review Pt. 1

"It's not a lie if we know the truth."

-J.P. Riccardi, GM, Toronto Blue Jays

J.P. Riccardi would find himself at home in the waxing days of the Central Intelligence Agency. Tim Weiner's new book Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, is a focused, well-written and, superficially well-researched history of the agency from its predecessor during WWII the OSS until the Iraq War. This review will concern itself with the first third of the book, which, by itself, contains enough material to discuss for days. During this period, we see the fledgling government agency using every manner of deception possible. Unfortunately for the agency, it exerted most of this energy internally, desperate to cover-up its monumental blunders from an antagonistic executive and legislative branch.

Weiner compartmentalizes his book anecdotally: a chapter about the CIA in Korea; a chapter about the CIA in Eastern Europe; a chapter about the CIA in Iran; etc. All of his sources are ex-CIA officials or those directly involved with the agency, and amazingly, they all speak on the record. The organization of Weiner's book adds to its readability; it is very much like a long feature piece in a newspaper.

The tone of the book is condemning. Weiner portrays the agency as a group of adventurous rogues, filled with hubris after WWII, run amok. This is especially the case as we see the CIA focus less and less on intelligence gathering (they failed to cultivate one effective source in the Soviet Union in the first fifteen years of its existence) and more and more on covert operations. What Weiner regards as most egregious about this is not that such a mis-guided approach left America vulnerable, but that the operations they undertook were done with little to no oversight. Allen Dulles, the director during most of the Eisenhower administration, and his deputy director of operations, Frank Wisner, were cowboys who put little thought into the strategic ramifications of their plans. When these plans failed (which they did far more often than succeeded) and were exposed by foreign governments, the CIA would launch a massive propaganda effort in Washington to save face. Thankfully, a combination of no oversight (it's secret) and Allen Dulles' brother John Foster being SecState meant that no one probed too deeply. Their justification for the obfuscation was consistent with J.P. Riccardi's above axiom.





Riccardi gave this guy a five-year deal, then had to act surprised when he got hurt.







The accounts of the failures are worth the reading, especially the misadventures in North Korea and Indonesia. The Indonesia example shows how far off the reservation the agency went, with the CIA aiding and equipping a rebellion while the American military simultaneously aided government forces. Unfortunately, the sheer scope of Weiner's book, and his exclusive reliance on ex-CIA officers opens him up to some egregious errors in scholarship.

Obviously, Weiner cannot become an expert on every single country and region in which the CIA operates; that is why they employ area experts (experts that were routinely ignored in the early days for not staying on message). Instead, he relies on his sources to tell the story. Nominally, this shouldn't be a problem. After all, why would an agent lie about a failed operation that hurt America and the agency? Unfortunately, as is the case with Syria in 1949, this is exactly what happened.




The only thing a cougar ever has to lie about is her age. Rowwr.






Weiner cites Miles Copeland's account that the CIA orchestrated a coup in 1949 in Syria that brought Adib Shishakli to power. Copeland wrote a book in the sixties called The Game of Nations, in which he originally claimed responsibility for Shishakli's ascension. The problem is, most historians, both Eastern and Western, believe this to be false. Copeland makes a number of extravagant claims in this book, sometimes putting himself in two places at the same time. Furthermore, Weiner's account is out of context; Shishakli's "coup" was the second one of the calendar year and the third within 365 days. In those days, Syria was low-hanging fruit for a coup. Copeland has widely been discredited by historians as a braggart, someone who tried to write himself into history by overstating his role. Given Weiner's descriptions of most CIA agents, one would assume that this is not an isolated incident.

One of the thematic subjects of Weiner's book is that a sense of adventure, self-aggrandizement and ego motivated early CIA officers as much as any sense of patriotism or integrity. He shows why these men are untrustworthy, then uses these unreliable men as sources. If intelligence work and espionage are fraught with deception and logical Catch-22's, then writing a history of it is even more so. Weiner compiled a work of great breadth but he cannot possibly know the historical ins and outs of every country that he writes about it; that would take nothing short of a lifetime of scholarship. As important and ambitious as the work is, by relying on admittedly unreliable people, it's deeply and innately flawed.







A real black-eye.

An Empty Gesture and the End of Debate

The Tawafuq Front (Accordance Front), the largest Sunni bloc in the Iraqi parliament, withdrew 5 of its 6 cabinet members last night in protest of al-Maliki's government. They said they will not rejoin the cabinet until their demands are met, which include the release of Sunni prisoners and a greater voice in decision-making. The leader of al-Tawafuq told Al-Hayat that "we arrived at this deadlocked position with al-Maliki, who makes his decisions in a unilateral manner without consulting other elements (of the government) then acting as if his decisions were that of the group."

Al-Hayat states that al-Maliki's cabinet is now almost entirely composed of Shi'a's and Kurds, who cannot agree on anything either. The current political imbroglio is nothing new to Iraqi politics, and can and will be used by both war supporters and detractors to support their point. This fact alone shows how hollow of a gesture it was.

War supporters (a title that antagonizes some people with legitimate arguments for staying) point out that al-Tawafuq's withdrawal coincides with the beginning of the parliament's summer recess, where most of its members go to their villas in Lebanon and France. A walk-out now is the equivalent of Ferris cutting school in mid-August: Mr. Rooney isn't around to care. Furthermore, this move is not without precedent. Moqtada al-Sadr orchestrated a walk-out of his bloc from the parliament and cabinet last November, only to send them back to work a few months later. The fallout from a potential permanent withdrawal is too great for al-Tawafuq members to endure, both politically and personally, just as it was for al-Sadr. Those that don't yet believe the war to be lost will not be surprised when the bloc rejoins the parliament at the beginning of next month, whether or not its demands are fulfilled.



You shouldn't be throwing anyone with your bad knee, Ed.



To opponents of the continuation of American involvement, this is just more fuel for the fire. First of all, there was the oil distribution and re-Ba'athification legislation that has been kicked around to no avail for the last six months. Then there was the parliament's recess, guaranteeing that there will be no political progress towards reconciliation by the time of General Petraeus' speech before Congress come Sept. 15th. Then there is the ongoing violence. Al-Tawafuq taking its ball and going home is just the final nail in the coffin.

After four and half years in Iraq, and four and a half years of intense bombardment of this issue (and more coming with the presidential election ramping up), is this where the American people are? Has everyone made-up their mind about the war, and any new development can be used to support either viewpoint? If you want to stay the course, the upcoming Petraeus speech will prove you right. if you want to withdraw, the Petraeus speech will vindicate you, too. It is possible that Americans have become so numb to the violence in Iraq that it would take a cataclysmic event (be it there or here) to swing the tide one way or another. Even then, both sides of the debate will probably use said hypothetical event to their own advantage.








These two never listened, and they built a damn freeway around them.






If this is the case, then God help us, because we won't be helping ourselves. Bush's consistently dismal approval ratings, an indicator of public support for the war (philosophy majors be damned), show the ossifying of opinion. It's easy to become close-minded, citing everything as support for your own arguments. It will take all of the energy we have to stay focused, continually questioning our own ideas and conclusions.

Another Follow-up

The NY Times ran an article in which the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, exposed the Bush administration's favorite tactic of leaking comments to the NY Times. In response to the Times report last week that the Saudis were undermining Iraqi security, and more specifically, comments by Zalmay Khalilizad to the same effect, Prince Saud said, "I was astonished by what he said, especially since we have never heard from him these criticisms when he was here."

It's times like these that I remember my junior year in high school. At the time, I thought that once you got out of high school, as you met more and more mature people, the petty back-handed compliments and rumor-spreading would slowly fade away. Nice to know that no one ever matures past the age of 16. Or, in the unlikely event that you do, you're a real stick in the mud and no one likes you. I shouldn't name names... Brad.